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Introduction
Despite military targeting successes against al-Qa'ida (variant: al-Qaeda) leadership over the last 14 years, al-Qa'ida's network and influence continues to grow. More significantly, its narrative has been gaining traction, reaching target audiences in far-flung areas across the globe, contributing to the radicalization of more young individuals, and generating a greater number of recruits for al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents (AQAA). As a result, we find a recruiting pool today that's larger and more easily accessible compared to that of 14 years ago. This recruiting pool and deep bench developed from a group of Islamist extremists with whom AQAA shares its underlying ideology: Salafism. The Salafi movement offers Salafi-Jihadists like AQAA fertile ground planted with seeds of extremists who, with comparatively little indoctrination by way of narratives, may become ready to make the jump from non-violent extremism to violent extremism (in this case, from non-violent Salafism to Salafi-Jihadism). This paper addresses this issue and surrounding dynamics within the Muslim community, some of which have been observed first-hand by the Muslim author of this paper. It begins by providing the reader with an overview of al-Qa'ida's narrative. It then presents AQAA's foundational ideology as well as insights from historically influential scholars who have impacted and shaped today's Salafi-Jihadist groups. Later, this paper will discuss a mixture of counternarratives, to be used in various combinations as custom-designed solutions for specific communities in which stakeholders will implement the counternarratives. It will also introduce moderate Muslim scholars and activists who support those counternarratives and, correspondingly, shall illustrate the differences between mainstream orthodox Sunni Muslims and Salafists. Worth noting, this paper uses the terms "moderate", "traditional", and "mainstream" interchangeably to refer to orthodox Sunni Muslims. Orthodox Sunni Muslims comprise only
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UNCLASSIFIED those who follow the Ash'ari or Maturidi creeds and who belong to one of the traditional four schools of jurisprudence -Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, or Hanbali. Lastly, this paper will highlight a model in which many of the proposed counternarratives and methods have proven fruitful.
What is al-Qa'ida's narrative?
Al-Qa'ida (AQ) essentially imparts the narrative that "Islam is under attack" 1 and that governments all over the world are exploiting Muslims. In their narrative, these rulers include 44 He subsequently formed a counter-extremist think tank called the Quilliam Foundation, for which he holds the title of Co-Founder and Chairman. 45 Quilliam functioned as the platform from which Nawaz would disseminate counternarratives to violent extremism. 46 Nawaz's experiences would serve as useful counter radicalization case studies for members of youth communities who might be walking the fine line between non-violent extremism and
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Implications for Countering AQ's Narrative
Method
For counternarratives to be effective, they must have mainstream orthodox Sunni religious leaders taking the lead, quoting early and contemporary Islamic scholars influential in the regions, nations, and communities in which these counternarratives will be disseminated.
These religious figures and leaders must emphasize AQ's ideology (Salafism) as being deviant and the violent tactics of Salafi-Jihadists as being unlawful in shari'a. In regions like the Gulf, and more specifically, Saudi Arabia, non-violent Salafist scholars would have to take the lead in condemning violent forms of Salafism (Salafism-Jihadism), as opposed to Salafism/Wahhabism as a whole, since Wahhabism is a state-sponsored and nationally espoused ideology there. In other countries, however, a more effective and lasting solution would be for Muslim communities therein to criticize Salafi ideology overall and send it back to the fringes as it had been throughout Islamic history. A one-size-fits-all 47 approach will yield counterproductive aftereffects, so it is important to plan effectively by studying those potential communities and consulting national, provincial/state, community level stakeholders early on in the process.
Content
Counternarratives should cover topics pertaining to Islamic laws and perspectives on: 
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Key Considerations
Conclusion
The counternarrative initiatives mentioned in this paper will obviously require government support in the form of public-private partnerships and sufficient financial backing.
In addition to private donors and, more importantly, governments providing support to antiextremist Islamic groups within their own countries, multinational entities such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum's (GCTF's) newly-formed Hedayah 58 project could also provide funding for these endeavors at a global scale. One key criterion in this initiative is ensuring correct identification of a moderate anti-extremist group with which to partner, a mistake government entities have made in the past. The ability to distinguish Salafists from mainstream orthodox Sunni entities is of utmost importance. In addition to the ideological differences between mainstream Muslims and Salafists as described earlier in this paper, one indicator of a 
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Using good practices as advised in the GCTF's Ankara Memorandum, and once a framework is in place, one can begin spreading narratives to counter AQAA's messaging.
Muslim leaders, former radicals and activists from within the community would disseminate the counternarratives at the grassroots level using the same platforms as those utilized by AQAA 59 -most notably Muslim community centers, mosques, university campuses 60 and online chat rooms and websites. This would entail that these institutions add moderate mainstream Muslim scholars, former radicals, celebrities, and activists to their lists of "recommended" guest speakers and invite them often, as they do with Salafist speakers. Additionally, these institutions would need to add a variety of Islamic scholarly literature to their libraries, to include those by scholars and activists mentioned in this paper and others who counter AQ, Salafist, and Salafist-Jihadist narratives.
Moreover, it would behoove the global community at large to have access to Englishlanguage (and later, other major languages) scholarly websites that offer rulings and recommendations on various issues facing Muslims. Such websites should also incorporate "askthe-scholar" forums, where individuals can pose specific questions to scholars designated to answer questions on those websites as a part of their regular duties. Such a platform would serve particularly useful to the youth community, which typically has limited or no access to moderate Muslim scholarly voices. 59 Baker, Extremists in Our Midst, 2. 60 Husain, "A Global Venture to Counter Violent Extremism."
